In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.
Introduction
The purpose of this note is to illustrate the power of an ingenious technique pionnered independently by Barbera and Peleg (1990) and La ond (1980) and called the technique of option sets 1 which has been used extensively and successfully to characterize the implications of strategyproofness in many di erent settings. To quote Zhou (1991) , one, out of many scholars, who has used it: " It is direct and simple, invoking neither the Arrow theorem, nor any monotonicity argument. Yet, it is so powerful that under its framework many interesting issues can be adressed". Out of many contributions 2 , we can cite for instance Barbera, Masso and Neme (1997) and Barbera, Masso and Serizawa (1998) 
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sets to investigate the case in which the domain is the class of multidimensional single-peaked preferences and the range is a compact set and Berga and Serizawa (2000) who use it in their exploration of maximal domains for strategy-proofness.
This simple notion is de ned as follows. Consider a society of individuals who has to select an alternative out of a feasible set X and a social choice mechanism mapping any conceivable pro le R of preferences into an alternative. The option set O S (R S ) of a coalition S of individuals (given the preferences R S reported by the individuals outside the coalition)
is the set of alternatives that they can reach through an appropriate joint report R S of their preferences. Therefore, the option set of coalition S describes the "scope of in uence" of coalition S given the pro le R S of reports by individuals outside S. A social environment is characterized by a set X and and a domain D of admissible preferences. Given a social environment (X; D), the technique of options sets consists in sorting out gradually the properties that these di erent option sets must possess if the mechanism is required to satisfy some properties, on top of which some weak or strong versions of strategyproofness.
In this note, we illustrate this technique in the case where X = R m and D is the set of Euclidean preferences. This result is extracted from a work that was done twenty years ago 3 (Bordes, La ond and Le Breton (1990) . The result states that, if m 2, any surjective and coalitional strategyproof mechanism is dictatorial. The main part of the proof consists in the analysis of the case where there are two dimensions and two individuals. It uses elementary tools from basic geometry and is self contained. Most of the proof consists in showing that to prevent the mechanism to be manipulated by any one of the two individuals, say 2, the option set of 2 must be a disk. This proof is twenty years old and, likely, some better selfcontained proofs can be provided. Since then, many new results have been discovered. In the last section, we o er a brief account of some of the main achievements and open problems in this branch of the literature.
The Model
We consider a society N = f1; 2; :::; ng of individuals who has to select an alternative in the Euclidean space X = R m . The preference R i of any individual i 2 N is entirely described by a point p i 2 R m and de ned as follows : xR i y i k x p i k k y p i k where k : kdenotes the usual Euclidean norm on R m4 . The point p i is called the peak of individual i as it is 3 The old version was containing a brief account of some of the results contained in the doctoral thesis of the second author. In the last part of this note, we o er a short presentation of some of his ideas.
4 kxk = hx; xi 1 2 where h:; :i denotes the usual inner product.
the (unique) mostly prefered alternative of individual i : any individual orders alternatives according to their distance with respect to his peak. If an alternative is interpreted as the location of a public facility and p i as the place of residence of individual i, Euclidean preferences can be interpreted as preferences for smallest distances to the facility when the transportation network is unrestricted. Hereafter, we will denote by E the domain of Euclidean preferences over R m .
A social choice mechanism is a mapping C from E n into X. Since preferences in E are identi ed to their peaks, we will alternatively describe C as a mapping from R nm into R m mapping a pro le p = (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) of peaks into a social alternative C(p) = (C 1 (p); C 2 (p); :::; C m (p)). Given a pro le p 2 R nm and a coalition S N , we denote by p S 2 (R m ) N nS the restriction of the pro le to N nS. A social choice mechanism C is strategy-proof if there does not exist i 2 N; p 2 R nm and b
A mechanism is coalitional strategy-proof if if there does not exist
The mechanism C is unanimous if C(p; p; :::; p) = p. C is anonymous if C(p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) = C(p (1) ; p (2) ; :::; p (n) ) for all permutations : N ! N and all p 2 R nm . C is (component-
3 The Result Proposition If m 2, then any coalitional strategy-proof social choice mechanism C over the domain E such that R(C) = R m is dictatorial .
The Proof
As already pointed out, the proof is based on the technique of options sets. Given a pro le p 2 R nm and a coalition S N , we de ne the option set of coalition S at pro le p denoted
The option set of a coalition S, given the preferences reported by the individuals outside the coalition, is the set of alternatives attainable by the members of S if they jointly control the preferences that they report. It is the range of the social choice
The following two properties are quite general (i.e. independent of the speci c Euclidean setting considered here) and have been demonstrated several times. We will not repeat these arguments here.
Step 1 : If p 2 R(C), then C(p; p; :::; p) = p
Step 2 (Closeness) : For all p 2 R nm and S N , O S (p S ) is a closed subset of R m
The Case where n=m=2
In this section we will denote simply O 1 (p 2 ) and O 2 (p 1 ) the options set of individuals 1 and 2.
Step after step, we will re ne our knowledge of the options sets.
Step 3 :
Step 4 :
Step 5 (E ciency) :
Step 6 (Star-shapedness) : O 2 (p 1 ) is star-shaped with respect to p 1 . If O 2 (p 1 ) = fp 1 g the conclusion follows. Suppose that there exists t 6 = p 1 such that t 2 O 2 (p 1 ). We want to show that [
and assume on the
An immediate consequence of step 6 is the following. Given any ray L with endpoint p 1 ,
Step 7 (Tangency) : Let L be a ray with endpoint p 1 and L ? (z) be the line orthogonal to L containing z. Then O 2 (p 1 ) is contained in the half plane P (z) with frontier L ? (z) and
Assume on the contrary that there exists x 2 O 2 (p 1 ) such that:
Then, there exists y 2 L such that k y x k<k y z k. The existence of such y follows from the fact that if we take y on L su ciently far from z, then x will be in the interior of the disk centered on y with radius k y z k. This argument is illustrated on gure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here From steps 4 and 5, C (p 1 ; y) = z but since x 2 O 2 (p 1 ), there exists p 2 such that x = C (p 1 ; p 2 ). Since k y C (p 1 ; p 2 ) k<k y C (p 1 ; y) k, this contradicts strategyproofness.
Step
The claim follows from a repeated application of step 7.
As for step 8, it follows from a repeated application of step 7.
At this stage, for every p 1 2 R 2 , there are three possible cases:
is a compact subset of R 2 , star-shaped with respect to p 1 and such that
We demonstrate that case 3 cannot hold true. Suppose on the contrary that it does.
Step 10 (Convexity) :
Suppose on the contrary that there exist u; t 2 O 2 (p 1 ) and
Consider the ray L with endpoint p 1 and containing w. By construction, we deduce . From the properties of O 2 (p 1 ), the function f is well de ned. From step 10, f is concave and therefore (Rockafellar (1970) ), it is left di erentiable and right di erentiable eveywhere. Let f 0 + (a) and f 0 (a) be the right and left derivatives of f at a.
Step 11 :
Without loss of generality, assume on the contrary that f
in the half plane with frontier L and containing p 1 . Let L be the line orthogonal to L
contradicting our assumption. From step 9, we deduce that [w; (a; f (a))] O 2 (p 1 ). Since further [w; (a; f (a))] L , we deduce that any ray L 0 with endpoint p 1 and intersecting
. But this contradicts step 7. The argument is illustrated on gure 3.
Insert Figure 3 here 5 We normalize to 0 the slope of the line orthogonal to the line generated by p 1 and (a; f (a)) and passing through (a; f (a)).
From step 11, we know that f is di erentiable.
Step 12 (Geometry) : O 2 (p 1 ) is a disk centered on p 1 . From step 7 we know that (1; f 0 (a)) is orthogonal to (a; f (a)) for all a 2 ]0; k[ i.e. f is solution of the di erential equation:
F is solution of the di erential equation:
whose solutions are:
and therefore:
Step 13 : Case 3 does not hold true 
The following claim shows that we can invert the quanti ers.
Step 14 (Dichotomy) :
Assume on the contrary that there exist p 1 ; p The proof of the result when n = m = 2 is complete. When O 2 (p 1 ) = fp 1 g for all p 1 2 R 2 , 1 is a dictator and when O 2 (p 1 ) = R 2 for all p 1 2 R 2 , 2 is a dictator.
The Case where m = 2 and n 2
The proof is by induction on n. From the preceding section, we know that the result holds true when n = 2. We assume that it holds true when the number of individuals is less than n 1. Let us consider the option set O 1 (p 1 ) of the coalition S = N n f1g when individual 1 reports the preference p 1 .
Step 15 :
The proof follows with no changes the arguments from step 6 to step 13 once steps 4 and 5 have been replaced respectively by the following two properties:
The rst property follows in fact from an argument similar to one implicit in step 1 applied to the mechanism C 1 (p 1 ) while the second follows from e ciency. If If p 2 ; p 3 are such that k p 1 p 3 k<k p 1 p 2 k, then the two equalities above contradict the assumption that C is strategyproof.
The Case where m 2 and n 2
The proof is by induction on m. From the preceding section, we know that the result is true when m = 2. We assume that it is true when the number of dimensions is less than m 1.
Let p 2 R nm . If there exists an hyperplane H such that p i 2 H for all i = 1; :::; n, then we deduce from the e ciency of C that C(p) 2 H as the convex hull of the set fp 1 ; :::; p n g is contained in H. We deduce from the induction hypothesis that the restriction C H of the social choice choice mechanism C to H n is dictatorial. If n m, it follows from the argument above. If n > m, consider p 2 R nm and let z = C(p). Let z n C(p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n 1 ; z). We claim that z n = z. Indeed, if z n 6 = z, then since k C (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n 1 ; p n ) z k<k C (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n 1 ; z) z k, we would contradict our assumption that C is strategyproof. By repeating n m + 1 times this argument, we obtain:
C(p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p m 1 ; z; z; ::; z) = z
Since the set fp 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p m 1 ; zg is contained in an hyperplane, we conclude that z = p 1 .
Related Literature
In this last section, we o er a brief and selective review of the related literature and formulate some open problems.
The Case where m=1
The result has ben established under the assumption that there are at least two dimensions.
When m = 1, the result does not hold. There exist coalitional strategy proofness social choice mechanisms which are not dictatorial. The exploration of the class of strategyproof mechanisms in the one dimensional setting started with the seminal paper of Moulin (1980) . A complete account of is large literature can be found in Barbera (2010).
Changing the Domain and/or the Range
In this paper, a social choice mechanism has been de ned as a function from R mn into R m .
We could consider the general case of a function C from A n into B where A and B are i.e. the set of admissible ideal points as well as the set feasible alternatives is assumed to be the set of vertices of the unit square together with its center. Consider the mechanism C : A n ! A de ned as follows: is at least second best alternative for all Euclidean preferences with an ideal point in A, it is easy to check that, this mechanism is coalitional strategyproof. We could object that in this example A is not a product set. Having a product set does not help either. In the case where A = f(0; 0) ; (0; 1) ; (1; 0) ; (1; 1)g, the mechanism C de ned by C(p) = (p 
Strategyproofness and E ciency
Can we replace, in the statement of the result, coalitional strategyproofness by (Pareto) e ciency and strategyproofness ? By de nition, the answer is a rmative when n = 2. But it is not when n 3. For instance when X = R 2 and n = 3, the social choice mechanism selecting the median of the coordinates of the ideal points for each of the two coordinates is surjective, strategyproof and Pareto e cient. Looking at our proof is quite instructive. While the coalitional strategyproofness property is preserved when we move from the mechanism C to the (sub)mechanism C i (p i ), the Pareto e ciency property is not. The induction argument which is used in our proof breaks down. These observations raise a new question : what are the implications of the conjunction of strategyproofness and e ciency in the Euclidean setting ? This question has been explored by Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1992 ,1993a ,1993b in a series of important papers.
They consider the subclass of anonymous social choice mechanisms. One striking result that Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1992) establishes asserts that if C is a strategyproof and e cient social choice mechanim, then C is continuous. Following Moulin (1980) (for the case where m = 1) and Border and Jordan (1983) , they de ne the notion of coordinatewise median scheme as follows. A collection fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m g R m is a coordinate system if x j ; x k = 0 for all j; k = 1; :::; m with j 6 = k i.e. fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x m g is an orthogonal basis of R m . Let k 2 N so that k + n is odd. A social choice mechanism C is a coordinatewise median social choice mechanism with k constant points (phantom points) if there exists a coordinate system and points c 1 ; c 2 ; :::; c k 2 fR [ f 1; 1gg m such that: where M ed denotes the median of the subsequent real numbers and all coordinates are expressed with respect to the given coordinate system. They show that if m 2 and n is even, or if n 3, then there does not exist surjective social choice mechanism which are anonymous, e cient and strategyproof. However when m = 2 and n is odd, the class of anonymous, e cient and strategyproof social choice mechanisms is non empty. More precisely, the class of anonymous, e cient and strategyproof social choice mechanisms coincides exactly with the class of coordinatewise median social choice mechanism without constant points. This result was established also by Kim and Roush (1984) with the additional assumption that C is continuous. But, as already pointed out by Peters, van der Stel and Storcken, this property is implied by the others and is therefore redundant.
Strategyproofness
Coalitional strategyproofness is often strictly more demanding than strategyproofness. It is therefore natural to wonder what is the class of strategyproof social choice mechanisms when X = R m . The coordinatewise median social choice mechanisms are strategyproof.
More generally, we can construct componentwise social choice mechanisms by constructing separately a social choice mechanism for each of the m components where the choice of the j th social coordinate only depends upon the vector p j = p This a di cult question which has been adressed by La ond (1980) in his thesis and also by Kim and Roush (1984) . Kim and Roush focus on the case where X = R 2 . They prove that a social choice mechanism is continuous and anonymous (but not necessarily surjective)
i it is a coordinatewise median social choice mechanism with n + 1 constant points. Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1993b) proves that if C is strategyproof then C is continuous i R(C) is convex. They further point out that if C is surjective then C is strategy proof and anonymous i it is a coordinatewise median social choice mechanism with n 1 constant points La ond 's work (1980) considers the case where n = 2 but m is arbitrary. He focuses on the class of anonymous, continuous, surjective and strategyproof social choice mechanisms.
As already pointed out, to conduct his analysis, he also invented the technique of option sets. His analysis consists in a gradual exploration of the properties of the sets O 2 (p 1 ) and O 1 (p 2 ). First, he demonstrates that if C is surjective, continuous and strategyproof, the option sets are closed and convex subsets of R m . This implies that C (p 1 ; p 2 ) is the projection of p 1 on O 1 (p 2 ) and the projection of p 2 on O 2 (p 1 ). Of course some consistency condition is needed since the two options sets cannot be constructed independently of each other. The main part of his work consists in sorting out the implications of this consistency.
We have no space here to go through all his lengthy analysis. We just sketch some of his main ideas. To show what kind of mechanisms will appear out of La ond's exploration, consider, for the sake of illustration 7 , the case where C (p 1 ; p 2 ) is the projection of p 2 on p 1 +K 2 where K 2 is the convex cone fx 2 R 2 : x 1 0; x 2 0 and x 2 x 1 g. By construction, O 2 (p 1 ) = p 1 +K 2 and C is not manipulable by 2. It is easy to show that C is not manipulable either. Further, it can be veri ed that O 1 (p 2 ) = p 2 + K 1 where
2 is called the polar of the cone K 2 . The construction is illustrated on gure 5.
Insert Figure 5 here
Another illustration is the case where individual 1 is a dictator on the rst coordinate and individual 2 is a dictator on the second coordinate. In such case, K 2 is the vertical axis and K 1 is the horizontal axis. In the rst example, K 1 has a non empty interior while its is empty in the second one. These two examples violates anonymity. Anonymity prevails i K ? 2 = K 1 . Such cones are called self-polar (or self dual cones). Let K be an arbitrary closed and convex self-polar cone with an non empty interior. As shown by La ond, the social choice mechanism where equivalently the social outcome is the projection of p 1 on p 2 + K or the projection of p 2 of 2 on p 1 + K is strategyproof, anonymous and continuous. This construction leads to a large family of anonymous, surjective, continuous and strategyproof social choice mechanism. What mechanisms do we nd in that family ?
First, and not surprisingly (from what precedes), we nd the class of coordinatewise median social choice mechanism with one constant point at in nity. The self-polar cone attached to any such mechanism is (up to a rotation) the positive orthant R m + . When m = 2, R 2 + is the unique (up to a rotation) self-polar cone of R 2 . When m = 2, any social choice mechanism constructed along these lines is decomposable. However, when m 3, this is not true anymore. This follows from the fact that when m 3, the family of self-polar cones is much richer. The analysis of these objects is a well de ned area in mathematics (see e.g. Barker and Foran (1976), Lochum (1984) ) and one merit of La ond's construction is to point out this connection.
The above construction raises the following question : What is the speci city of the class of anonymous, surjective, continuous and strategyproof social choice mechanisms constructed by La ond through self-polar cones ? La ond shows that, to answer the above question, we have to examine the asymptotic cone 8 of the option set O(p). In particular, he rst shows that if C is an anonymous, surjective, continuous and strategyproof social choice mechanism,
where O is a correspondence with closed and convex values such that
shows that if K has a non empty interior, then C belongs to the class which has just been constructed i.e. O(p) = p + K and K is self-polar.
Superdomains
The set of Euclidean preferences on R m is in one to one correspondence with R m . Many authors have explored the questions examined in this note for sets of preferences who are supersets of the set of Euclidean preferences. One important such a superdomain is the set of diagonal (separable) quadratic preferences. They are described by utility functions u such that:
Another (larger) superdomain is the all set of quadratic preferences described by utility functions u such that: Among other things, decomposability obliges to abandon the idea of using the information on preferences which is contained in the vectors i 2 R m ++ and therefore to limit the information on preferences to the peaks of the individual preferences 9 . This decomposability result implies here a property which has been called in the literature a tops only property 10 .
In many other social environments settings, it is also an implication of strategyproofness. They prove that any surjective and strategyproof social choice mechanism over the set of quadratic preferences is dictatorial. Their result has been generalized by Zhou (1991) who weakens the surjectivity assumption to a very weak range condition.
The superdomains discussed above are parametric. We could consider classes of preferences which are not described by a nite set of parameters. For example we could consider the class of preferences on R m represented bu utility functions u such that:
9 Decomposability implies more restrictions. 10 On this, see Weymark (1999) .
where each v j : R ! R has a unique maximizer from which it decreases monotonically in either direction. This domain has been explored by many authors including among others Barbera, Gul and Stachetti (1993) . It is important to note that if it can been shown that strategyproofness implies the top only property, then we are back to the parametric domains considered earlier. Barbera (2010) o ers a detailed exposition of this area of research.
Finally, we could also consider the questions explored in this note for a class of preferences generated by a distance di erent from the Euclidean distance. This question is explored extensively in van der Stel who considers some other norms. In location problems, the set A is a assumed to be a closed and connected subset of R m and for all p; q 2 A, the distance between d(p; q) is the shortest distance from p to q (and q to p). Schummer and Vohra (2002) have examined the implications of surjectivity and strategyproofness in the case where A is the union of a nite number of closed curves of nite length.
